Justice Blackmun\u27s Capital Punishment Jurisprudence by Stewart, Malcolm L.
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 26
Number 1 Fall 1998 Article 11
1-1-1998
Justice Blackmun's Capital Punishment
Jurisprudence
Malcolm L. Stewart
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation




by MALCOLM L. STEWART*
Introduction
In Callins v. Collins, issued during the final Term of Justice Black-
mun's tenure on the Supreme Court, the Justice filed a dissenting
opinion stating that he felt "morally... obligated simply to concede
that the death penalty experiment has failed."1 The Callins dissent
made clear that the Justice would thenceforth vote to vacate the sen-
tence of death in any capital case coming before the Court. In that
respect, the position taken by Justice Blackmun during his final Term
resembled those of Justices Brennan and Marshall from 1976 until
their retirements from the bench.
Unlike Justices Brennan and Marshall, however, Justice Black-
mun did not assert that the punishment of death is per se cruel or
excessive. That is, he did not deny that the death penalty is an appro-
priate punishment for some criminals. Rather, the thrust of his dissent
was that the American criminal justice system, at least as it currently
operates, is incapable of reliably identifying those individuals. 2 On
that basis Justice Blackmun concluded that "the death penalty ... as
currently administered, is unconstitutional."3
Justice Blackmun based that conclusion in part on what he per-
ceived to be the irrevocable conflict between two lines of Supreme
Court precedent. The first, having its genesis in Furman v. Georgia,4
held that the decision whether to impose a capital sentence in a partic-
ular case cannot be entrusted to the unfettered discretion of the sen-
tencing jury or judge.' Rather, to ensure that different capital
* Assistant to the Solicitor General, United States Department of Justice. The opin-
ions expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not represent the views
of the Solicitor General, the Department of Justice, or the United States.
1. 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
2. See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
3. Id. at 1159 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
4. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
5. See id.
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defendants (at least within a given state) are treated in an evenhanded
and consistent manner, the legislature must provide standards to
guide and narrow the scope of the sentencer's discretion. 6 The second
line of authority is most commonly associated with the Court's deci-
sions in Woodson v. North Carolina7 and Lockett v. Ohio.' Those de-
cisions recognize a constitutional right to "individualized" sentencing
in capital cases and a right, in particular, to present any and all evi-
dence that the sentencer might regard as mitigating. In Callins, Justice
Blackmun concluded that these cases could not be reconciled, explain-
ing that "[e]xperience has taught us that the constitutional goal of
eliminating arbitrariness and discrimination from the administration
of death.., can never be achieved without compromising an equally
essential component of fundamental fairness-individualized sentenc-
ing."9 He further concluded that neither principle could permissibly
be sacrificed for the other, and that no acceptable balance between
the two could be struck.10
Justice Blackmun also advanced a second justification for his de-
termination that the death penalty, as currently administered, is un-
constitutional. He explained that his previous willingness to enforce
the capital punishment statutes was premised on his belief that ade-
quate procedural safeguards-including, in particular, the availability
of federal habeas corpus review-ensured that errors in the adminis-
tration of the death penalty would be discovered and corrected." Jus-
tice Blackmun stated, however, that in light of recent Supreme Court
decisions sharply limiting the scope of federal habeas review of state
convictions and sentences, he could no longer feel confident "that the
Federal Judiciary will provide meaningful oversight to the state courts
as they exercise their authority to inflict the penalty of death .... ",,2
Until his dissenting opinion in Callins, Justice Blackmun had con-
sistently adhered to the view that the Constitution permitted the im-
position of capital punishment, and on numerous occasions he had
voted to uphold capital sentences. 3 Indeed, Justice Blackmun had
6. See id.
7. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
8. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
9. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1144 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
10. See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
11. See id. at 1157 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 1158-59 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
13. During each of the two Terms prior to his dissent in Callins, however, Justice
Blackmun had indicated that his continued willingness to acknowledge the constitutional-
ity of capital punishment was open to question. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333,
dissented in both Furman and Woodson, concluding in each case that
he could see no principled basis for rejecting the state legislature's
decision regarding the manner in which the death penalty should be
administered. Even before his appointment to the Court, however,
the Justice had expressed skepticism as to the wisdom and utility of
capital punishment. Close examination of Justice Blackmun's capital
punishment opinions reveals his difficult, even agonized, efforts to rec-
oncile opposing values that he ultimately found irreconcilable.
This analysis of Justice Blackmun's capital punishment jurispru-
dence examines three distinct stages of his tenure on the Supreme
Court. Part I discusses a series of cases decided during the 1970s in
which the Court considered broad constitutional challenges to a vari-
ety of state capital sentencing regimes. Despite his personal opposi-
tion to capital punishment, during that period Justice Blackmun
displayed great deference to state legislative judgments regarding the
proper administration of the death penalty. Part II analyzes a series
of dissenting opinions written by the Justice during the mid-1980s.
Those dissents reflect his growing concern that state prosecutors, state
trial judges, and a majority of the Supreme Court itself were unwilling
to devote the care and attention necessary to ensure that individual
capital cases were litigated in a fair and professional manner. Part III
discusses a series of dissenting opinions written by Justice Blackmun
during his final years on the Court. In these highly emotional opin-
ions the Justice argued that the Court's limitations on federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction had undermined the legitimacy of capital punish-
ment itself.
One of the central hallmarks of Justice Blackmun's tenure on the
Supreme Court was his commitment to deciding individual cases in a
fair and careful manner. Justice Blackmun was willing to accept the
constitutionality of capital punishment, and to accord broad deference
to state legislative judgments regarding the manner in which the death
penalty should be administered, so long as all participants in the pro-
cess would perform their roles in a spirit of diligence and professional-
ism. Over the course of his tenure on the Court, however, Justice
Blackmun appears to have become convinced that the incidence of
error and serious misconduct in the litigation of capital cases was
unacceptably high. Moreover, the Supreme Court's restrictions on
federal habeas review-during the Justice's final years on the bench-
359-60 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,
446 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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led him to conclude that no reliable mechanism existed for ensuring
that such errors were detected in a timely fashion.
I. Early Challenges to State Captial Sentencing Regimes
The Court heard argument in McGautha v. California,4 exactly
five months after Justice Blackmun took the oath of office. McGautha
was sentenced to death under California law, which provided for a
separate sentencing proceeding before the same jury that had decided
the question of guilt or innocence. Whether the defendant should be
sentenced to death or life imprisonment was at the jury's absolute dis-
cretion.'5 McGautha argued that the state's failure to provide stan-
dards to guide the jury's sentencing determination violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 6
The Court rejected McGautha's contention by a vote of 6-3, with
Justice Blackmun joining the majority opinion filed by Justice Harlan.
The majority began by observing that "[o]ur function is not to impose
on the States, ex cathedra, what might seem to us a better system for
dealing with capital cases.' 1 7 The Court could have rested its constitu-
tional analysis on the principle of judicial restraint: suggesting that the
adoption of determinate capital sentencing standards by the States
would be desirable, while disclaiming the authority to require such
standards as a matter of constitutional law. The Court did not, how-
ever, adopt that approach. Rather, it stated that "history reveals con-
tinual efforts, uniformly unsuccessful, to identify before the fact those
homicides for which the slayer should die."' 8 It suggested that any
future efforts to devise such standards would be doomed to failure
and stated that "[t]o identify before the fact those characteristics of
criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death
penalty, and to express these characteristics in language which can be
fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to
be tasks which are beyond present human ability."' 9 The Court de-
voted particular attention to the aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances listed in the Model Penal Code, asserting that "such criteria do
not purport to provide more than the most minimal control over the
14. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
15. See id. at 189-90.
16. See id. at 196.
17. Id. at 195.
18. Id. at 197.
19. Id. at 204.
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sentencing authority's exercise of discretion."" ° It concluded its dis-
cussion of the issue by stating:
[i]n light of history, experience, and the present limitations of
human knowledge, we find it quite impossible to say that com-
mitting to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to
pronounce life or death in capital cases is offensive to anything
in the Constitution. The States are entitled to assume that ju-
rors confronted with the truly awesome responsibility of decree-
ing death for a fellow human will act with due regard for the
consequences of their decision and will consider a variety of fac-
tors, many of which will have been suggested by the evidence or
by the arguments of defense counsel. For a court to attempt to
catalog the appropriate factors in this elusive area could inhibit
rather than expand the scope of consideration, for no list of cir-
cumstances would ever be really complete. The infinite variety
of cases and facets to each case would make general standards
either meaningless "boiler-plate" or a statement of the obvious
that no jury would need.2 '
Thus, while the holding of McGautha was simply that the Constitution
did not prohibit the States from vesting capital sentencing juries with
standardless discretion, the Court's analysis suggested that any at-
tempt to promulgate such standards would be futile at best, and
counterproductive at worst.
The petitioner in McGautha did not contend that the death pen-
alty was per se violative of the Constitution, and the Court did not
squarely address the issue.21 The Court's analysis plainly presumed,
however, that the insusceptibility of the capital sentencing decision to
legal constraints did not render capital punishment unconstitutional.
The Court stated that "[i]n light of history, experience, and the pres-
ent limitations of human knowledge, we find it quite impossible to say
that committing to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power
to pronounce life or death in capital cases is offensive to anything in
the Constitution."'  Taken literally, this language would compel re-
jection of any constitutional challenge to the propriety of the death
penalty itself.
20. Id. at 207.
21. Id. at 207-08.
22. Justice Black directly addressed the question in his opinion concurring in the judg-
ment, stating: "[t]he Eighth Amendment forbids 'cruel and unusual punishments.' In my
view, those words cannot be read to outlaw capital punishment because that penalty was in
common use and authorized by law here and in the countries from which our ancestors
came at the time the Amendment was adopted." Id. (Black, J., concurring).
23. Id. at 207.
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Just over a year later, however, the Court abruptly shifted course.
In Furman v. Georgia,24 the Court considered three consolidated capi-
tal cases, two involving rape and one involving murder.25 The Geor-
gia and Florida statutes under review in Furman left to the jury's
unfettered discretion the decision whether a capital defendant should
be sentenced to death or to a term of imprisonment.26 The Court's
decision in Furman effectively invalidated all state and federal death
penalty provisions then in existence.
Furman was highly fractured; each of the nine Justices filed a sep-
arate opinion, and no Justice in the majority joined in the opinion of
any other.' Justices Brennan and Marshall argued that the death
penalty was unconstitutional per se.28 While Justices Douglas, Stew-
art, and White held that the Georgia and Texas statutes directly at
issue in the case violated the Eighth Amendment, their opinions left
open the possibility that the States could amend their capital punish-
ment laws in a way that would satisfy the Constitution.2 9 Their opin-
ions also stressed the lack of standards governing the jury's sentencing
determination, as well as the apparent arbitrariness of the process by
which a small subset of persons convicted of capital crimes were sen-
tenced to death, while other similarly situated defendants were
spared.
Justice Blackmun dissented in Furman." His constitutional anal-
ysis rested upon three basic arguments. First, the Justice asserted that
the Court had not adequately justified its departure from existing pre-
cedent. Canvassing prior Supreme Court decisions, he observed that
"until today capital punishment was accepted and assumed as not un-
constitutional per se under the Eighth Amendment or the Fourteenth
Amendment."31 That the Constitution permits the imposition of the
24. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
25. See id. at 239.
26. See id. at 308-09 & nn.8-9 (Stewart, J., concurring).
27. As one commentator stated "[Furman] is not so much a case as a badly orches-
trated opera, with nine characters taking turns to offer their own arias." Robert Weisberg,
Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. CT. Rnv. 305, 315. Justice Blackmun's complaint in Callins
that "the Court has chosen to deregulate the entire [death penalty] enterprise," 510 U.S. at
1145, may be drawn (consciously or unconsciously) from the title of Professor Weisberg's
article.
28. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 314 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
29. See id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at
310 (White, J., concurring).
30. See id. at 405 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun also joined the dissent-
ing opinions filed by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist. See id.
31. Id. at 407 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
death penalty was, he observed, "either the flat or the implicit hold-
ing" of a number of the Court's decisions, culminating in Justice
Black's separate opinion in McGautha only the previous year.32 The
Justice acknowledged that precedent alone was not dispositive, stating
that he "certainly subscribe[d] to the proposition[ ] that the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause 'may acquire meaning as public opinion
becomes enlightened by a humane justice."' 33 He expressed skepti-
cism, however, that public attitudes had substantially changed during
the brief interval between the Court's prior decisions upholding the
death penalty and its contrary ruling in Furman.34
Second, Justice Blackmun argued that the decision of the major-
ity was inconsistent with the limited role of the federal courts in our
constitutional scheme. He stated that
[o]ur task here, as must so frequently be emphasized and re-
emphasized, is to pass upon the constitutionality of legislation
that has been enacted and that is challenged. That is the sole
task for judges. We should not allow our personal preferences
as to the wisdom of legislative and congressional action, or our
distaste for such action, to guide our judicial decision in cases
such as these.35
He emphasized the breadth of the Court's disruption of legislative
policy choices, observing that "[n]ot only are the capital punishment
laws of 39 States and the District of Columbia struck down, but also
all those provisions of the federal statutory structure that permit the
death penalty apparently are voided."36 Justice Blackmun noted that
the enactment of recent federal capital punishment provisions re-
vealed essentially unanimous legislative support for the death penalty,
at least in certain circumstances.37 He found it "impossible . . . to
believe" that the members of Congress who voted to enact those
measures "were callously unaware and insensitive of constitutional
overtones in legislation of this type," and concluded that elected legis-
lators were "far more conscious of the temper of the times, of the
maturing of society, and of the contemporary demands for man's dig-
nity, than are we who sit cloistered on this Court.
38
32. Id. at 407-08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 409 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349, 378 (1910)).
34. See id. at 410 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("My problem.., is the suddenness of the
Court's perception of progress in the human attitude since decisions of only a short while
ago.").
35. Id. at 411 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
36. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
37. See id. at 412-13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 413 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Finally, Justice Blackmun warned that the Court's decision might
have unintended and untoward consequences. He construed the opin-
ions of Justices Stewart and White to suggest that capital sentencing
statutes making imposition of the death penalty mandatory for speci-
fied offenses might survive constitutional review." Justice Blackmun
stated that he feared the result
will be that statutes struck down today will be re-enacted by
state legislatures to prescribe the death penalty for specified
crimes without any alternative for the imposition of a lesser
punishment in the discretion of the judge or jury, as the case
may be. This approach, it seems to me, encourages legislation
that is regressive and of an antique mold, for it eliminates the
element of mercy in the imposition of punishment. I thought we
had passed beyond that point in our criminology long ago.4 °
In his concluding paragraph, Justice Blackmun once again distin-
guished between his own policy preferences and his conception of the
judicial role. He observed that he found the Court's holding "difficult
to accept or to justify as a matter of history, of law, or of constitutional
pronouncement," even though he "personally .. .rejoice[d] at the
Court's result.
41
Insofar as its constitutional argument, nothing in Justice Black-
mun's Furman dissent was in any way remarkable. Each aspect of the
analysis-the recitation of precedent, the invocation of judicial re-
straint, and the warning of unintended consequences-is a familiar
staple of judicial rhetoric and argumentation. Rather, its striking fea-
ture is its opening passage:
Cases such as these provide for me an excruciating agony of the
spirit. I yield to no one in the depth of my distaste, antipathy,
and indeed, abhorrence, for the death penalty, with all its as-
pects of physical distress and fear and of moral judgment exer-
cised by finite minds. That distaste is buttressed by a belief that
capital punishment serves no useful purpose that can be demon-
strated. For me, it violates childhood's training and life's exper-
39. See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
40. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In a similar vein, Chief Justice Burger's dissent
stated:
[I]t has been widely accepted that mandatory sentences for crimes do not best
serve the ends of the criminal justice system. Now, after the long process of draw-
ing away from the blind imposition of uniform sentences for every person con-
victed of a particular offense, we are confronted with an argument perhaps
implying that only the legislatures may determine that a sentence of death is ap-
propriate, without the intervening evaluation of jurors or judges. This approach
threatens to turn back the progress of penal reform, which has moved until re-
cently at too slow a rate to absorb significant setbacks.
Id. at 402-03 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 414 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
iences, and is not compatible with the philosophical convictions
I have been able to develop. It is antagonistic to any sense of"reverence for life." Were I a legislator, I would vote against
the death penalty for the policy reasons argued by counsel for
the respective petitioners and expressed and adopted in the sev-
eral opinions filed by the Justices who vote to reverse these
convictions.42
This passage seems to me altogether extraordinary. It is, of course,
quite common for a judge or Justice to vote to sustain a legislative
judgment against constitutional challenge, while acknowledging that
he might reach a different judgment were he, himself, the legislator.
But it is highly unusual for a judge to express "distaste, antipathy, and
indeed, abhorrence" for the legislative judgment being upheld. Per-
haps even more arresting, is the introductory statement that "[c]ases
such as these provide for me an excruciating agony of the spirit."'43
That statement is an unusually stark and forthright acknowledgment
that the subordination of individual policy preferences implicit in the
judicial role can be a source not only of intellectual difficulty, but of
personal anguish as well.
Within four years of the Supreme Court's decision in Furman,
thirty five States enacted new death penalty laws. Those statutes fell
largely into one of two categories. Many States enacted "guided dis-
cretion" statutes providing for a separate penalty trial after a convic-
tion for a capital crime. Those laws typically required the sentencer-
usually the jury, but occasionally the judge-to consider a variety of
statutory aggravating and mitigating factors similar to those listed in
the Model Penal Code. Other States responded to Furman by enact-
ing laws requiring courts to impose a capital sentence upon any de-
fendant convicted of specified crimes.
In 1976, the Court addressed constitutional challenges to both
types of capital sentencing regimes. The Court upheld the guided dis-
cretion statutes, with only Justices Brennan and Marshall dissenting.'
The lead opinion, co-authored by Justices Stewart, Powell, and Ste-
vens, construed Furman to "mandate[ ] that where discretion is af-
forded.., on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a
42. Id. at 405-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). As his Furman dissent pointed out, Justice
Blackmun had expressed personal reservations regarding the propriety of capital punish-
ment while still on the court of appeals. See iL at 407 & n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138, 153-54 (8th Cir. 1968), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 398 U.S. 262 (1970).
43. Furman, 408 U.S. at 405 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
44. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); see also Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976).
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human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably
directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and
capricious action."45 The plurality concluded that both the Georgia
and Florida statutes satisfied that constitutional requirement.46
By a 5-4 majority, however, the Court struck down North Caro-
lina and Louisiana statutes that mandated a sentence of death upon
conviction for first-degree murder. 47 The plurality opinion acknowl-
edged that the Constitution does not generally prohibit state legisla-
tures from determining that all persons convicted of specified crimes
should be subject to the same mandatory penalties.48 It concluded,
however, that
in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underly-
ing the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of the char-
acter and record of the individual offender and the
circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally in-
dispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.
This conclusion rests squarely on the predicate that the penalty
of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprison-
ment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life
imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of
only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there
is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a spe-
cific case.
49
Because the North Carolina statute precluded a sufficiently individu-
alized determination of the appropriate penalty in a particular capital
case, the plurality concluded, that the statute was unconstitutional.5"
The plurality found that the Louisiana statute suffered from a similar
constitutional defect, and it was invalidated as well.5
45. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.
46. See id. at 196-207 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); Proffitt, 428 U.S.
at 247-60 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
47. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325 (1976). The Court acknowledged that the Louisiana statute defined the crime of
first-degree murder in somewhat narrower terms than did the North Carolina law, but it
concluded that the difference was without constitutional significance. See Roberts, 428 U.S.
at 331-36.
48. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
49. Id. at 304-05 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
50. See id. at 305 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
51. See id. at 335-36 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). On the same day
that it decided Gregg, Proffitt, Woodson, and Roberts, the Court also issued its decision in
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), upholding the Texas death penalty statute against con-
stitutional challenge. The Texas capital punishment law was not easily analogized to either
the Georgia and Florida laws that the Court upheld, or the North Carolina and Louisiana
statutes that the Court struck down. The Texas law provided that defendants convicted of
Justice Blackmun voted to uphold the death sentence in each of
the five capital cases decided by the Court in 1976. In none of those
cases did he offer an explanation of his views. Rather, in each case he
filed a one-sentence opinion concurring in or dissenting from the
Court's judgment, supported only by citation to his own Furman dis-
sent and to the other dissenting opinions issued in Furman.52
In light of his dissenting opinion in Furman, Justice Blackmun's
willingness to uphold the Georgia and Florida statutes was not sur-
prising. His position in Woodson and Roberts-in particular, his sug-
gestion that his vote to affirm followed necessarily from the views that
he and the other Furman dissenters had expressed-was, however,
less predictable. The Justice's dissent in Furman had expressed partic-
ular disapproval of mandatory capital sentencing schemes, character-
izing them as "legislation that is regressive and of an antique mold."53
Certainly that opinion did not commit Justice Blackmun to the view
that a mandatory capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional. But it
was odd to suggest that the Furman dissent provided an adequate ref-
utation of the constitutional challenge to the North Carolina and Lou-
isiana laws.
When the Court issued its decisions in the 1976 death penalty
cases, a reasonable observer might well have thought Justice Black-
mun believed that the federal Constitution imposes no meaningful
constraints on state legislatures' freedom to fashion procedural re-
gimes for the administration of the death penalty. Justice Blackmun
had not simply rejected the proposition that capital punishment is per
se unconstitutional. He had voted both to uphold state laws that
specified categories of murder would be sentenced to death if, but only if, the jury con-
cluded that: (1) the crime "was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expecta-
tion that the death of the deceased or another would result"; (2) that the defendant was
likely to "commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to
society"; and (3) that the conduct of the defendant was not a reasonable response to provo-
cation by the deceased. Id. at 269 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
The Court's decision to uphold some of the challenged statutes while striking down
others was attributable to Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, who voted as a bloc (and
wrote the lead opinion) in each of the five cases. Justices Brennan and Marshall voted to
invalidate each of the five death penalty statutes, while Chief Justice Burger and Justices
White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist voted to uphold them all.
52. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 227; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 261; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 307-08;
Roberts, 428 U.S. at 363.
53. Furman, 408 U.S. at 413 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Indeed, in the Florida legisla-
tive debates held in the fall of 1972, supporters of a guided discretion death penalty statute
invoked the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Burger in Furman, and in particular its
condemnation of mandatory sentencing laws,s as evidence that the Court would invalidate
a mandatory death penalty statute. See Malcolm Stewart, Enactment of the Florida Death
Penalty Statute, 1972: History and Analysis, 16 NovA L. REv. 1299, 1320, 1322-23 (1992).
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vested the capital sentencing jury with unfettered discretion, and to
uphold state laws that gave the sentencing jury no discretion at all.
Moreover, he indicated that the various dissenting opinions issued in
Furman provided a sufficient constitutional defense of all types of cap-
ital sentencing laws.
Two years later, the Court issued its decision in Lockett v. Ohio.54
Lockett was a 21-year-old woman convicted as an aider and abettor in
the murder of a pawnshop operator killed during the course of a rob-
bery. She had waited in the getaway car while the robbery took place.
The State's key witness testified that none of the conspirators had in-
tended for a killing to occur, but that a gun held by one of the robbers
had gone off when the pawnbroker attempted to grab it.55
Under Ohio law, murder committed in the course of an aggra-
vated robbery carried a mandatory death sentence unless the defend-
ant could establish one of the three statutory mitigating factors: (1)
that the victim had induced or facilitated the offense; (2)that the de-
fendant had acted under duress or coercion; or (3)that the offense was
primarily the result of psychosis or mental deficiency. 6 The trial
judge, apparently concluding that none of the statutory mitigating cir-
cumstances were present, found that he had "'no alternative, whether
[he] like[d] the law or not,"' but to sentence Lockett to death.
7
In arguments before the Supreme Court, Lockett contended
"that her death sentence [wa]s invalid because the statute under which
it was imposed did not permit the sentencing judge to consider, as
mitigating factors, her character, prior record, age, lack of specific in-
tent to cause death, and her relatively minor part in the crime."58 The
Supreme Court reversed Lockett's death sentence. In an opinion
written by Chief Justice Burger, a four-Justice plurality relied on the
lead opinion in Woodson in holding that the "qualitative difference
between death and other penalties calls for a greater degree of relia-
bility when the death sentence is imposed." 59 The plurality concluded
on that basis that "the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require
that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be
precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a de-
fendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the of-
fense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
54. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
55. See id. at 589-90.
56. See id. at 589, 593-94.
57. Id. at 594.
58. Id. at 597.
59. Id. at 604.
death."6 Justices White and Rehnquist strongly objected to that as-
pect of the plurality's analysis, arguing that it reintroduced the very
arbitrariness that Funnan had condemned.6'
Justice Blackmun articulated a middle ground, concurring in the
judgment "for a reason more limited than that which the plurality es-
pouse[d] ... "62 He explained that "the Ohio judgment in this case
improperly provided the death sentence for a defendant who only
aided and abetted a murder, without permitting any consideration by
the sentencing authority of the extent of her involvement, or the de-
gree of her mens rea, in the commission of the homicide."'63 Justice
Blackmun would have required "that the sentencing authority have
discretion to consider the degree of the defendant's participation in
the acts leading to the homicide and the character of the defendant's
mens rea."' He also observed:
[t]his approach is not too far off the mark already used by many
States in assessing the death penalty. Of 34 States that now
have capital statutes, 18 specify that a minor degree of participa-
tion in a homicide may be considered by the sentencing author-
ity, and, of the remaining 16 States, 9 allow consideration of any
mitigating factor.65
60. Id. (footnote omitted). The Court explained its reference to "the rarest kind of
capital case" by noting that it "express[ed] no opinion as to whether the need to deter
certain kinds of homicide would justify a mandatory death sentence as, for example, when
a prisoner-or escapee-under a life sentence is found guilty of murder." Id. n.1l.
61. See id. at 623 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in
the judgments) ("I greatly fear that the effect of the Court's decision today will be to
compel constitutionally a restoration of the state of affairs at the time Furman was de-
cided.. ."); id. at 631 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("the new
constitutional doctrine will not eliminate arbitrariness or freakishness in the imposition of
sentences, but will codify and institutionalize it.").
62. Id. at 613 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
63. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
64. Id. at 615-16 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
65. Id. at 616-17 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Blackmun ac-
knowledged that his opinion in Lockett marked a departure from his prior deference to
state legislatures regarding the procedures to be employed in capital cases. He explained
that
[t]hough heretofore I have been unwilling to interfere with the legislative judg-
ment of the States in regard to capital-sentencing procedures, this Court's judg-
ment as to disproportionality in [Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)], in which
I joined, and the unusual degree to which Ohio requires capital punishment of a
mere aider and abettor in an armed felony resulting in a fatality even where no
participant specifically intended the fatal use of a weapon, provides a significant
occasion for setting some limit to the method by which the States assess punish-
ment for actions less immediately connected to the deliberate taking of human
life.
l at 616 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted).
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Though both Justice Blackmun and the Lockett plurality con-
cluded that Lockett's death sentence had been unconstitutionally im-
posed, their modes of analysis differed significantly. Justice Blackmun
did not endorse the plurality's categorical holding that the capital sen-
tencer must be permitted to consider "any aspect of a defendant's
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that
the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death."
66
Rather, Justice Blackmun attached particular significance to evidence
"concerning the defendant's degree of participation in the homicide
and the nature of his mens rea in regard to the commission of the
homicidal act."67 Justice Blackmun did not explain why that form of
mitigating evidence was entitled to special consideration, beyond not-
ing that the large majority of States with death penalty statutes per-
mitted it to be taken into account in determining the appropriate
sentence. His opinion suggests the possibility, however, of an alterna-
tive approach to mitigating evidence in capital cases.
Under that approach, the constitutional right to present mitigat-
ing evidence would be limited to those factors that have traditionally
been deemed central to an assessment of an individual's criminal cul-
pability. Whether a particular mitigating circumstance falls into that
category would be ascertained by reference both to historical practice
and to contemporary state enactments. State statutes (like Ohio's)
that precluded consideration of such factors by the sentencing judge
or jury would be held unconstitutional. With respect to mitigating cir-
cumstances as to which no historical or contemporary consensus ex-
isted, however, individual States could determine whether a particular
factor was sufficiently relevant to the capital sentencing decision so as
to justify its consideration by the sentencer.68
Such a regime might have imposed significant burdens upon the
Supreme Court, which would have had ultimate responsibility for de-
termining which mitigating circumstances are and are not so funda-
mental as to give them constitutional status. That approach would,
however, have enabled the Court to recognize some constitutional
66. Id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
67. Id. at 616 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
68. Two commentators have advocated a very similar approach, arguing that "the indi-
vidualization requirement of the Eighth Amendment is most sensibly understood to man-
date consideration of evidence of reduced culpability in capital cases." Carol S. Steiker &
Jordan M. Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out? Refining the Individualization Requirement in
Capital Sentencing, 102 YALE L.J. 835, 858 (1992). They explain that "[t]he focus on culpa-
bility is apparent in current state statutory schemes and consonant with historical efforts,
both common law and statutory, to separate capital murder from murders warranting a
sentence less than death." Id.
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right for a capital defendant to introduce mitigating evidence, while
remaining faithful to the Funnan principle that the decision whether
an individual will be sentenced to death may not ultimately be en-
trusted to the sentencer's unfettered discretion. Indeed, alone among
the eight Justices who participated in Lockett, Justice Blackmun rec-
ognized the possibility of a middle ground between a rule that a capi-
tal defendant must be permitted to introduce whatever potentially
mitigating evidence he wishes, and a rule that the State's authority to
determine what circumstances will be regarded as mitigating is subject
to no constitutional constraints.
Close examination of Justice Blackmun's early capital punish-
ment opinions may thus make his Callins dissent seem particularly
surprising. In concluding that "the death penalty, as currently admin-
istered, is unconstitutional,"69 the Justice relied heavily upon his per-
ception that the rule announced in Furman was irrevocably in tension
with the WoodsonlLockett line of cases, and that both lines of author-
ity set forth fundamental constitutional principles. Justice Blackmun
dissented in Furman and Woodson, however, and in Lockett he con-
curred on grounds substantially more limited than those articulated by
the plurality.
One feature common to all of the cases discussed above is that
each involved a direct constitutional challenge to the governing state
death penalty statute. In McGautha, Furman, and Woodson, the de-
fendants' constitutional claims did not depend in any meaningful way
on the facts of their individual cases. Rather, they raised what were in
essence facial challenges to the governing state death penalty laws;
and Justice Blackmun voted to reject each claim. In Lockett, Justice
Blackmun declined to adopt the broad rule articulated by the plural-
ity, and he took pains to emphasize that the rule he endorsed was
consistent with the death penalty statutes of a large majority of the
States whose laws provided for capital punishment. Justice Black-
mun's jurisprudence during this period may, therefore, be best under-
stood as reflecting not an uncritical acceptance of all aspects of the
States' administration of the death penalty, but a particular deference
to state legislative judgments concerning the manner in which capital
punishment should be implemented.
69. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1159 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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H. Growing Concerns: Dissenting Opinions in the Mid-1980s
During his first 13 years on the Court, Justice Blackmun occasion-
ally joined in decisions overturning capital sentences. 70 He did not,
however, dissent from a single decision upholding a sentence of death
until the final day of the 1982 Term, when he filed dissenting opinions
in three such cases.
7'
During the 1980s, however, the Supreme Court confronted an in-
creasing number of capital cases that involved challenges to the man-
ner in which individual trials had been conducted, rather than
challenges to the terms of the governing statutes. In that context Jus-
tice Blackmun, with increasing frequency, voted to sustain the consti-
tutional claims raised by capital defendants. Perhaps more
significantly, Justice Blackmun began to write separately, frequently
expressing the view that other actors involved in the administration of
the death penalty had devoted insufficient care to their tasks.
The most substantial of his 1980s' dissents came in Barefoot v.
Estelle.72 The defendant in Barefoot was convicted of killing a Texas
police officer and was sentenced to death by a jury.73 Under Texas
law, a jury may impose a capital sentence only if it determines, inter
alia, that "there is a probability that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to
society."'74 At the penalty phase of Barefoot's trial, the State intro-
duced the testimony of two psychiatrists who stated that Barefoot was
likely to commit further criminal acts.7 The jury sentenced Barefoot
to death.
70. In addition to Lockett, see Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,364 (1977) (Blackmun,
J., concurring in the judgment); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Presnell v. Georgia,
439 U.S. 14 (1978) (per curiam); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam); God-
frey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980); Adams v.
Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981); Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782 (1982). Gardner is the only one of those cases in which Justice Blackmun filed an
opinion, and his concurrence simply indicated that he considered himself bound by the
Court's judgments in Woodson and Roberts. See Gardner, 430 U.S. at 364.
71. One commentator has stated that Justice Blackmun, having "remained virtually
silent in capital cases" until the end of the 1982 Term, "seemed almost to explode in rhetor-
ical force" in his three dissenting opinions. Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court The
Death Penalty and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. Rv. 1741, 1817 (1987).
72. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
73. See id. at 883.
74. Id. at 884.
75. See id. The majority opinion in Barefoot blandly asserted that "[t]he State also
called two psychiatrists, John Holbrook and James Grigson, who, in response to hypotheti-
cal questions, testified that petitioner would probably commit further acts of violence and
represent a continuing threat to society." Id. at 884. As Justice Blackmun's dissent ex-
In the Supreme Court, Barefoot contended that the introduction
of the psychiatric testimony bearing on future dangerousness violated
his rights under the Constitution.76 He was supported by an amicus
brief filed by the American Psychiatric Association (APA), which esti-
mated that "two out of three predictions of long-term future violence
made by psychiatrists are wrong."7 7 The Court rejected Barefoot's
constitutional claim. Observing that "[n]either petitioner nor the As-
sociation suggests that psychiatrists are always wrong with respect to
future dangerousness, only most of the time," the Court was "uncon-
vinced... that the adversary process cannot be trusted to sort out the
reliable from the unreliable evidence and opinion about future dan-
gerousness. '7 8 The majority recognized that scientific and other ex-
pert testimony is frequently excluded from federal trials on the
ground of unreliability. It found those cases inapposite, however, be-
cause they were "not constitutional decisions, but decisions of federal
evidence law."
79
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun found it "impossible to square
admission of this purportedly scientific but actually baseless testimony
with the Constitution's paramount concern for reliability in capital
sentencing."80 He observed that "unreliable scientific evidence is
widely acknowledged to be prejudicial," 81 because a lay jury may tend
to accept uncritically opinions offered by those who purport to be ex-
perts.8" He pointed out that even in non-capital cases, scientific evi-
plains, the medical testimony was a good deal more emphatic than the majority's descrip-
tion suggests. Both doctors testified that their psychiatric training gave them specialized
expertise in predicting violent behavior. See id. at 918-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Dr.
Holbrook testified that "within reasonable psychiatric certainty," Barefoot was likely to
commit future crimes of violence. Id. at 919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Dr. Grigson testi-
fied that Barefoot was "above ten" on a one-to-ten scale rating sociopathic tendencies, and
that there was a "one hundred percent and absolute" likelihood that Barefoot would com-
mit future violent crimes, whether he was incarcerated or released into society. Id. (Black-
mun, J., dissenting). Neither of the expert witnesses had examined Barefoot or requested
the opportunity to examine him. See id. at 917 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
76. See id. at 896.
77. Id. at 920 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
78. Id. at 901.
79. Id. at 899 n.6.
80. Id. at 923 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In that regard, Justice Blackmun invoked the
statement of the Woodson plurality that because the penalty of death is qualitatively differ-
ent from any other punishment, "there is a corresponding difference in the need for relia-
bility in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case." Id.
at 924 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305
(1976)).
81. Id. at 926 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
82. See id. at 926-28 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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dence is routinely excluded if the state of knowledge within the
pertinent discipline is considered insufficient.83
Justice Blackmun acknowledged that the exclusion of such evi-
dence typically rests on rules of evidence rather than constitutional
doctrine.84 He observed, however, that "the principle requiring that
capital sentencing procedures ensure reliable verdicts" was an estab-
lished constitutional rule.85 The apparent thrust of his analysis was
that the greater need for reliability in the capital sentencing context
provided a doctrinal basis for "constitutionalizing" what would other-
wise be unconstitutional rules of federal evidence law. Justice Black-
mun also rejected the majority's view that cross-examination and
rebuttal evidence should enable the jury to separate reliable from un-
reliable psychiatric testimony, asserting that the resulting "battle of
experts" would distract the jury "from an assessment of the propriety
of sentencing to death the defendant before it to resolving a scientific
dispute about the capabilities of psychiatrists to predict future
violence."86
The most striking feature of Justice Blackmun's Barefoot dissent,
however, is its rhetorical tone. The opinion is laced with open con-
tempt for the psychiatrists who had testified at Barefoot's trial and for
the state officials who had introduced their testimony. Justice Black-
mun stated that "while Doctors Grigson and Holbrook were
presented by the State and by self-proclamation as experts at predict-
ing future dangerousness, the scientific literature makes crystal clear
that they had no expertise whatever."87 Citing APA standards of con-
duct forbidding a psychiatrist from offering an opinion about an indi-
vidual he has not examined, the Justice asserted that "[t]he Court
today sanctions admission in a capital sentencing hearing of 'expert'
medical testimony so unreliable and unprofessional that it violates the
canons of medical ethics."88 He noted that "[t]he APA particularly
condemns the use of the diagnosis employed by Doctors Grigson and
Holbrook in this case, that of sociopathy." 89 Finally, he concluded
that "Texas' choice of substantive factors"-i.e., the legislature's de-
termination that a finding of future dangerousness should be a prereq-
uisite to a sentence of death-"does not justify loading the factfinding
83. See id. at 930 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
84. See iL at 931 n.9 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
85. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 934-35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
87. d2 at 922 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 924 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 932 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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process against the defendant through the presentation of what is, at
bottom, false testimony. '
Justice Blackmun's Barefoot dissent is wholly unlike anything
that the Justice had previously written on the subject of capital punish-
ment. Justice Blackmun had occasionally voted to invalidate
sentences of death, and he had voiced his personal opposition to the
death penalty. He had, however, neither dissented from a decision
upholding a capital sentence, nor previously expressed outrage or in-
dignation at the manner in which a State administered its system of
capital punishment. Clearly, Justice Blackmun's capital punishment
jurisprudence shifted dramatically in the years after Barefoot: he more
frequently voted in favor of capital defendants, expressed his views in
writing, and criticized what he perceived as abuses in the administra-
tion of the death penalty.
It is impossible to know whether Barefoot caused a significant
change in Justice Blackmun's approach to the legal issues surrounding
the administration of the death penalty, or whether the case fortui-
tously came before the Court at a time when the Justice's views were
changing for other reasons. Nevertheless, it seems to me entirely
plausible that Barefoot would elicit such an emotional reaction from
Justice Blackmun. The Justice quite evidently believed that the doc-
tors who testified at Barefoot's trial had betrayed the profession by
willfully misstating their ability to offer reliable expert opinion on the
subject of future dangerousness. Moreover, his high regard for the
medical profession would have caused him to view such a betrayal as
an extraordinarily serious breach. Justice Blackmun was also clearly
of the view that the state officials who prosecuted Barefoot had know-
ingly presented false and misleading evidence-evidence that was es-
pecially pernicious because it was offered by witnesses whom the jury
was particularly likely to believe-in their effort to obtain a capital
sentence. Thus, it is not unimaginable to assume that Justice Black-
mun's exposure to the case would substantially affect his willingness to
90. Id. at 938 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion also expresses frustra-
tion at the majority's willingness to tolerate what Justice Blackmun clearly regarded as a
manifest injustice. See id. at 935 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "One searches the Court's
opinion in vain for a plausible justification for tolerating the State's creation of this risk of
an erroneous death verdict." Id. at 935-36 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "Ultimately, when
the Court knows full well that psychiatrists' predictions of dangerousness are specious,
there can be no excuse for imposing on the defendant, on pain of his life, the heavy burden
of convincing a jury of laymen of the fraud." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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believe that the death penalty was being administered fairly in individ-
ual cases.91
Two other dissenting opinions filed by Justice Blackmun during
the middle part of the 1980s reflect his shifting perspective on the
death penalty. The first is Cabana v. Bullock.92 Cabana involved the
application of Enmund v. Florida93 (which held that a defendant may
be sentenced to death only if he is found to have killed, attempted to
kill, or intended that a killing take place or that lethal force be used).94
In Cabana, a Mississippi jury convicted and sentenced Bullock to
death for a killing that occurred during the course of a robbery which
he and another man perpetrated.95 His conviction and sentence were
upheld by the Mississippi courts.96 Bullock sought federal habeas re-
view, contending that the jury instructions given at his trial permitted
the jury to sentence him to death based solely upon his participation
in the underlying robbery, without making the findings required by
Enmund.97 The Fifth Circuit agreed. It vacated Bullock's death sen-
tence and directed the State either to impose a sentence of life impris-
onment, or to conduct a new sentencing hearing at which a jury could
determine whether a sentence of death was appropriate.98
The Supreme Court modified the appellate court's judgment.
The Court agreed that the instructions given to Bullock's sentencing
jury failed to satisfy the standard announced in Enmund.99 It dis-
agreed, however, with the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that proper En-
mund findings could be made only by a jury at a new sentencing
91. The other two dissents filed by Justice Blackmun on the same day were quite
short-less than a page apiece-but emotionally charged. See Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S.
939, 991 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1028-1029
(1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Barclay dissent stated that "when a State chooses to
impose capital punishment, as this Court has held a State presently has the right to do, it
must be imposed by the rule of law .... The errors and missteps [in Barclay's case]-
intentional or otherwise-come close to making a mockery of the Florida statute and are
too much for me to condone." 463 U.S. at 991 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Black-
mun's dissent in Ramos accused the majority of "substituting an intellectual sleight of hand
for legal analysis," and asserted that "[tihis kind of appellate review compounds the origi-
nal unfairness of the [challenged] instruction itself, and thereby does the rule of law disser-
vice." Id at 1029 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
92. 474 U.S. 376 (1986).
93. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
94. See id. at 798.
95. See Cabana, 474 U.S. at 379-81.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 381-82.
98. See id at 382.
99. See id. at 392.
hearing.1 "° It held that "the sentence currently in force may stand
provided only that the requisite findings are made in an adequate pro-
ceeding before some appropriate tribunal-be it an appellate court, a
trial judge, or a jury."10'
Justice Blackmun's dissent took issue with the majority's pro-
nouncement that constitutionally sufficient Enmund findings could be
made by an appellate court. He contended that the Court "ignores
both the proper institutional roles of trial and appellate courts and the
pragmatic and constitutional concerns with reliability that underlie
those roles."'" 2 He asserted that the majority's willingness to permit
essential findings of fact to be made by state appellate courts "turns
on its head the heightened concern with reliability that has informed
our review of the death penalty over the past decade."'1 3 Justice
Blackmun emphasized "the special competence of trial courts," noting
that in a variety of contexts the Court had recognized the superior
factfinding capabilities of trial judges, who have seen the witnesses
and are consequently well-positioned to make credibility determina-
tions.'0 4 He asserted that "a capital-sentencing scheme that permits
an appellate court to make Enmund findings sacrifices reliability
needlessly to no discernible end, and cannot satisfy the Eighth
Amendment."'' 0 Finally, he stressed that the case before the Court
raised the precise concerns that made trial-level sentencing
indispensable:
I have read the trial transcript. Although I think the evidence is
consistent with Bullock's claim that the killing of Mark Dickson
resulted from a drunken brawl between [a third party] and
Dickson that tragically got out of hand, I must concede that a
jury or judge who saw Bullock testify might well think he lied. I
fail, however, to see how an appellate court confidently could
conclude, without any indication from anyone who actually saw
him testify, that Bullock's account was so unworthy of belief
that he was properly condemned to death.0 6
100. See id
101. Id. at 392.
102. Id. at 397 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 399 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
104. Id at 400-01 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 402-03 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 406 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The un-
derscored language is vintage Blackmun, reflecting his commitment to the principle that
the task of any judge, on any court, is to decide the case before him correctly - not simply
to announce broad legal principles for other courts to follow. The sentence might loosely
be paraphrased as, "I am a Supreme Court Justice, but I am not afraid to get my hands
dirty."
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Justice Blackmun concluded that Bullock was entitled to a new sen-
tencing hearing before a jury, and he dissented form the majority's
determination that the requisite Enmund findings could be made by
an appellate court that had not observed the witnesses.
10 7
Later the same Term, Justice Blackmun dissented in Darden v.
Wainwright.08 Willie Darden was a black man sentenced to death in
Florida for the murder of a white store owner during the course of a
robbery.10 9 The store owner's 16-year-old son was shot and wounded,
and his wife was sexually assaulted.1l ° In the Supreme Court, Darden
contended, inter alia, that one member of the venire had been errone-
ously dismissed for cause by the trial judge, and that prosecutorial
misconduct at closing argument had rendered the trial fundamentally
unfair."'
Darden's case sparked an unusual public dispute within the Court
even before his case was heard on the merits. Under the Court's pro-
cedures, four votes are sufficient to grant certiorari, but five votes are
necessary to issue a stay of execution. The Court, by a vote of 5-4,
initially denied Darden's application for a stay." 2 Later the same day,
however, Darden's attorney requested that the prior stay application
be treated as a petition for certiorari." 3 Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens voted to grant the petition.
Justice Powell provided the fifth vote to grant a stay of execution,
filing a separate opinion stating that "[m]y vote is to grant the applica-
tion for a stay, although I find no merit whatever in any of the claims
advanced in the petition for certiorari.""' He explained that "in view
of the unusual situation in which four Justices have voted to grant
certiorari ... and in view of the fact that this is a capital case with
petitioner's life at stake, and further in view of the fact that the Jus-
tices are scattered geographically and unable to meet for a Confer-
107. See id. at 407 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
108. 477 U.S. 168, 188 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
109. See id. at 170-72.
110. See id. at 172-73.
111. See id. at 175.
112. See Darden v. Wainwright, 473 U.S. 927 (1985) (denying stay of execution). Jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall voted to grant Darden's stay application on the basis of their
view that the death penalty is in all circumstances violative of the Eighth Amendment. See
id. at 928 (granting stay of execution). Justices Blackmun and Stevens also voted to grant
the stay, explaining that "[b]ecause this Court has not yet had an opportunity to review the
denial of [Darden's] first petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus, we would grant the
application for a stay of execution to enable this Court to consider whether to grant certio-
rari in the normal course of business." Id. (granting stay of execution).
113. See id.
114. Id. (Powell, J., concurring in the granting of the application for a stay).
ence, I feel obligated to join in granting the application for a stay.""' 5
Chief Justice Burger dissented. He observed, inter alia, that Darden's
claims "ha[d] been passed upon no fewer than 95 times by federal and
state court judges.""' 6 He concluded that "[b]ecause we abuse our
discretion when we accept meritless petitions presenting claims that
we rejected only hours ago, I dissent.'
' 1 7
After briefing and argument on the merits, the Court rejected
each of Darden's claims by a 5-4 vote. Darden's challenge to the ve-
nire member's dismissal centered on the application of the Court's
prior decisions in Witherspoon v. Illinois 18 and Wainwright v. Witt,119
which held that a prospective member of a capital jury may be dis-
missed for cause based on his personal opposition to the death penalty
only if that opposition would substantially impair his ability to apply
the law of the State in accordance with the instructions given by the
trial judge.'20 The Court held that the governing standard had been
properly applied at Darden's trial. 2' It acknowledged that "[t]he pre-
cise wording of the question asked of [the venire member], and the
answer he gave, do not by themselves compel the conclusion that he
could not under any circumstances recommend the death penalty."' 2
The Court observed, however, that the venire member had been pres-
ent throughout the questioning of other jurors, when the correct legal
standard was repeatedly articulated.2 3 Based on "the record of voir
dire in its entirety," the Court concluded that the prospective juror
had been properly dismissed.' 24
The Court also concluded that Darden had not been deprived of
a fundamentally fair trial by prosecutorial excesses at closing argu-
ment. It accepted Darden's claim that the argument was improper,
stating that the State's closing argument "deserves the condemnation
it has received from every court to review it."' 2 For a variety of rea-
sons, however, the Court concluded that the prosecutors' remarks did
115. Id. at 928-29 (Powell, J., concurring in the granting of the application for a stay).
116. Id. at 929 (Powell, J., concurring in the granting of the application for a stay).
117. Id. (Powell, J., concurring in the granting of the application for a stay).
118. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
119. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
120. See id. at 423-24.
121. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 178 (1976).
122. Id.
123. See id. at 177.
124. Id. at 178 (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 179.
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not effect a constitutional violation because they did not render the
trial fundamentally unfair.'
26
Justice Blackmun began his dissent by noting the principle, fre-
quently reiterated in the Court's death penalty opinions during the
previous ten years, that "the Eighth Amendment requires a height-
ened degree of reliability in any case where a State seeks to take the
defendant's life."' 27 He accused the majority of infidelity to that prin-
ciple, stating that "[t]oday's opinion . . . reveals a Court willing to
tolerate not only imperfection but a level of fairness and reliability so
low it should make conscientious prosecutors cringe."' 28 He detailed
the respects in which the prosecutors' closing argument had violated
applicable canons of ethics, 29 and he characterized one prosecutor's
summation as "a relentless and single-minded attempt to inflame the
jury."13
0
Justice Blackmun also dissented with respect to Darden's Wither-
spoon claim. Reviewing the transcript of the voir dire, he concluded
that the trial judge had failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into
Murphy's ability to follow the law and the court's instructions. He
then offered the following assessment:
[a] close reading of the lengthy voir dire transcript leads me to
conclude that the trial court's behavior is more easily explained
by Murphy's appearance in the jury box at the end of a long day
of questioning and the desire to finish jury selection expedi-
tiously than by any definite impression on the part of the trial
judge that Murphy was unqualified. But neither the trial court's
eagerness to get the trial started, nor this Court's impatience
with the progress of Darden's constitutional challenges to his
conviction and death sentence, see, e.g., 473 U.S. 928, 929 (1985)
(BURGER, C.J., dissenting from the grant of certiorari because
12 years had elapsed since Darden's conviction and no fewer
than "95" judges had reviewed the case), renders Murphy's ex-
clusion justifiable or harmless. 3 '
126. See id. at 182-83. In explaining its determination that the prosecutorial misconduct
had not rendered the trial fundamentally unfair, the Court stated that many of the objec-
tionable features of the prosecutors' remarks were invited by the defense; that the trial
judge had instructed the jury to decide the case based on the evidence alone; that the
evidence of guilt was very strong; and that defense counsel had effectively used his rebuttal
argument to draw the jury's attention to the prosecutors' excesses. See id. at 182.
127. Id. at 188-189 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 189 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
129. See id. at 191-92 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 192 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 204-05 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). In a
footnote, Justice Blackmun criticized Chief Justice Burger both for his initial dissent from
the grant of certiorari and for reprinting that dissent as part of his concurrence on the
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Justice Blackmun concluded that "this Court must do more than wring
its hands when a State uses improper legal standards to select juries in
capital cases and permits prosecutors to pervert the adversary process.
I therefore dissent.'
'1 32
Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinions in Barefoot, Bullock, and
Darden share three crucial features. First, none of the cases involved
a constitutional challenge to a state legislative decision regarding ap-
propriate capital sentencing procedures. Nor did the capital defend-
ants in those cases raise broad, systemic challenges that would have
had obvious implications for large numbers of capital trials. Rather,
each of the dissents focused on alleged improprieties in the conduct of
individual prosecutions. Indeed, during the period from 1983 to 1986,
when those dissents were written, Justice Blackmun continued to dis-
play his prior reluctance to second-guess state legislative pronounce-
ments regarding the proper administration of the death penalty.'3 3
Second, in each of the three dissents, Justice Blackmun relied on
a line of the Court's decisions holding that the Eighth Amendment
requires a heightened degree of reliability in the determination that
death is the appropriate punishment in a particular case.'3 In Bare-
merits. See id. at 205 n.9 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated that he
"kn[e]w of no other recent case in which a Justice has dissented on the ground that the
claims raised by the petitioner-which at least four Justices must have found worthy of full
consideration-were meritless." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He warned that "a public
dissent from a grant of certiorari poses dangers both to the actual workings of the adjudica-
tory process and to public respect for that process." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). And he
asserted that "[b]y reprinting his dissent in its entirety and emphasizing once again the
number of times this Court has been asked to review Darden's claims, THE CHIEF JUS-
TICE suggests that he irrevocably had committed himself to rejecting those claims before
he had received the benefit of the full briefing, oral argument, access to the record, and
discussion of the issues by other Members of the Court that followed our grant of certio-
rari." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 206 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
133. See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464 (1984) (Eighth Amendment not
violated if state reaches conclusion different from majority of states over how to best ad-
ministrate laws); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37,
54 (1984); Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372, 389 (1985). Even in cases that did not raise
constitutional challenges to state legislative judgments, Justice Blackmun often voted to
reject the claims of capital defendants. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 87
(1983) (per curiam); Sullivan v. Wainwright, 464 U.S. 109, 111-12 (1983) (per curiam);
Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 U.S. 377,378-80 (1984); Antone v. Dugger, 465 U.S. 200,205-06
(1984) (per curiam); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412,430 (1985); Lockhart v. McCree, 476
U.S. 162, 184 (1986).
134. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 924 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Ca-
bana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 399-400 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Darden v. Wain-
wright, 477 U.S. 168, 188-89 & n.1 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Court in
Woodson had invoked that principle as a basis for invalidating the North Carolina legisla-
ture's determination that death should be the mandatory penalty for specified categories of
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foot, Bullock, and Darden, however, he invoked the Woodson princi-
ple, not as a ground for overturning a legislature's systemic decisions
regarding the appropriate administration of the death penalty, but as a
doctrinal basis for giving particularly close scrutiny to case-specific
claims of legal error whenever such claims are raised within the con-
text of a capital case.'35
Finally, perhaps the most striking feature of the three dissents is
their bitter rhetorical tone. The dissents in Barefoot and Darden as-
serted that state prosecutorial officials had acted dishonorably in their
zeal to obtain convictions and capital sentences. Moreover the dis-
sents essentially accused the Supreme Court majority of failing to ap-
proach its task with the appropriate seriousness and commitment.
The thrust of the dissents was not simply that the Court had an-
nounced incorrect principles of law. Rather, the dissents suggested
that a majority of the Court, either through impatience at the slow
pace of the appellate process in capital cases, or through a lack of
commitment to resolving individual cases correctly, had simply aban-
doned any effort at careful consideration of the defendants' claims.
III. Restrictions on Federal Habeas Review
During his final years on the Court, Justice Blackmun consist-
ently voted to overturn capital sentence cases. 36 The capital cases
crimes. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,305 (1976). Justice Blackmun had of
course dissented from that decision.
135. Justice Blackmun's use of the Woodson principle in his Darden dissent is particu-
larly striking. That dissent's invocation of the need for a "heightened degree of reliability
in any case where a State seeks to take the defendant's life" appears to apply both to
Darden's claim of Witherspoon error and to his claim of prosecutorial misconduct at clos-
ing argument. Darden, 477 U.S. at 188-89 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The misconduct at
issue in Darden, however, occurred at the guilt phase of the trial, and Justice Blackmun
voted to reverse Darden's conviction. See id. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The appar-
ent premise of Justice Blackmun's Darden dissent is that the need for heightened reliability
in capital cases should influence not only an appellate court's review of the capital sentenc-
ing proceeding itself, but also its review of all aspects of the trial in a capital case. See id. at
196-97 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
136. I have found only three cases decided after 1987-none of them after 1989-in
which Justice Blackmun voted to reject, on the merits, a capital defendant's constitutional
challenge to his conviction or sentence of death. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231
(1988); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 183 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Hildwin
v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989) (per curiam). Justice Blackmun also joined the majority
opinion in Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) (holding that a fellow death row
inmate lacked standing to challenge the capital sentence of an inmate who had declined to
litigate on his own behalf). In Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992), Justice Blackmun
agreed with the majority's decision not to reach the merits of the defendant's claims,
though the Justice harshly criticized the standard announced by the majority in reaching
that most sharply divided the Justices, however, did not involve dis-
putes as to the merits of capital defendants' claims. Rather, the most
hotly contested questions involved the authority of federal courts (ex-
ercising habeas corpus jurisdiction) to review state-court criminal con-
victions and sentences.
The defendant in Dugger v. Adams137 was convicted by a Florida
jury of the first-degree murder of an 8-year-old child. 38 The jury rec-
ommended that the defendant be sentenced to death, and the trial
judge imposed a capital sentence. 139 The jury was instructed in a man-
ner that appeared to minimize the jurors' responsibility for the sen-
tence ultimately imposed-an instructional error that was held by the
Court in Caldwell v. Mississippi"4 to violate the Eighth Amend-
that result. See id. at 350-60 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 360,
373-75 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
Two cases in particular demonstrate the extent to which Justice Blackmun's views re-
garding the constitutional issues surrounding the death penalty had changed during his
time on the Court. The first is Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987). The second is
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
In Roberts (Harry) v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 637 (1977) (per curiam), the Court had
held that a Louisiana law mandating a sentence of death for the first degree murder of a
police officer violated the Eighth Amendment requirement of individualized sentencing in
capital cases. Justice Blackmun dissented from the opinion. See id. at 638 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). In the course of that dissent, he stated that "it is evident, despite the per
curiam's general statement to the contrary, that mitigating factors need not be considered
in every case; even the per curiam continues to reserve the issue of a mandatory death
sentence for murder by a prisoner already serving a life sentence." Id. at 641 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). In Sumner, however, Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion for the Court
striking down a Nevada statute that imposed a mandatory sentence of death for a prison
inmate who is convicted of murder while serving a sentence of life imprisonment without
possibility of parole. See 483 U.S. at 70-85.
In Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 176 (1982), the Court had struck down the
defendant's death sentences on the ground that the trial judge had considered himself to be
precluded from considering the defendant's youth as a mitigating circumstance. Chief Jus-
tice Burger's dissent, in which Justice Blackmun joined, argued that the Court had granted
certiorari solely on the question "whether the Eight and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit
the imposition of a death sentence on an offender because he was 16 years old in 1977 at
the time he committed the offense." Id. at 120 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The dissent con-
cluded, "I would decide the sole issue on whicti we granted certiorari, and affirm the judg-
ment," id. at 128 (Burger, C.J., dissenting),--language that unequivocally expressed the
dissenters' view that the Constitution did not preclude the imposition of capital punish-
ment upon an individual who was sixteen years old at the time he committed the crime. In
Stanford, however, Justice Blackmun joined Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion, which
argued that "to take the life of a person as punishment for a crime committed when below
the age of 18 is cruel and unusual and hence is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment." 492
U.S. at 382 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
137. 489 U.S. 401 (1989).
138. See id. at 402.
139. See id. at 404.
140. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
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ment.141 Adams, however, was tried several years before the decision
in Caldwell, and he did not challenge the instruction either at trial or
on direct appeal. After Caldwell was decided, Adams attempted to
raise the claim in a state habeas proceeding. The Florida Supreme
Court, however, refused to address it on the merits because Adams
had failed to raise the argument on direct appeal.'4
Adams then sought relief in federal court. The Court had previ-
ously held in Wainwright v. Sykes 43 that a procedurally defaulted
claim is cognizable on federal habeas review only if the petitioner can
show, inter alia, that there was "cause" for the default. The Court had
also indicated that one way for a habeas petitioner to establish
"cause" was to show that the claim was "so novel that its legal basis
[was] not reasonably available to counsel" at the time of the de-
fault.'" The Eleventh Circuit held that Adams' claim of instructional
error was so novel as to be unavailable to him at the time of his trial
and direct appeal, and that Adams had therefore established "cause"
for his default. 45 The court then held that the challenged instruction
violated the rule announced in Caldwell, and it therefore vacated Ad-
ams' sentence of death.
14 6
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that Adams' Cald-
well claim was reasonably available to him at the time of trial, and that
he had consequently failed to show "cause" for his procedural de-
fault. 4 7 Adams also defended the court of appeals' judgment on the
141. Thus, the trial judge instructed Adams's jury that "[t]he court is not bound by your
[sentencing] recommendation. The ultimate responsibility for what this man gets is not on
your shoulders. It's on my shoulders. You are merely an advisory group to me ... "
Dugger, 489 U.S. at 403. Because under Florida law a judge may reject the jury's capital
sentencing recommendation only "if the facts were 'so clear and convincing that virtually
no reasonable person could differ,"' Adams contended that the judge's instructions had
misled the jury regarding the scope of its sentencing responsibility. Id. at 405 (quoting
Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (1975)).
142. See id. at 405.
143. 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977).
144. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
145. See Adams, 489 U.S. at 406.
146. See id
147. In one sense Adams is a historical artifact. The Court's opinion plainly proceeds
on the assumption that a habeas petitioner may obtain federal review of a defaulted claim
by showing that the claim was so novel at the time of trial that he could not have been
expected to raise it. Less than a week before its ruling in Adams, however, the Court had
issued its decision in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), in which a plurality of four
Justices concluded that claims which, if accepted, would establish "new rules" of constitu-
tional law are not cognizable in federal habeas proceedings. See id. at 310. The Court's
subsequent explication of the Teague principle states that a rule of law will be regarded as a
"new rule" unless (at the time the defendant's conviction became final) the rule was so
clearly dictated by precedent that reasonable minds could not differ. See Butler v. McKel-
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alternative grounds that the Florida Supreme Court had not enforced
its procedural bar rule in a consistent fashion, and that dismissal of his
habeas petition would result in a "fundamental miscarriage of jus-
tice."' 4 8 In a lengthy footnote at the end of its opinion, the Court
rejected both of those contentions. 49
Justice Blackmun dissented. He did not take issue with the ma-
jority's conclusion that Adams had failed to establish "cause" for his
procedural default."' 0 He argued, however, that the court of appeals'
judgment should be affirmed because the Florida Supreme Court had
applied its procedural bar rule in an erratic manner,' 5 ' and because
the Caldwell error had so undermined the reliability of the sentencing
proceeding as to render imposition of the death penalty a "fundamen-
tal miscarriage of justice.'
5 2
Justice Blackmun's dissent in Adams captured two important as-
pects of his capital case jurisprudence in his later years on the Court.
The dissent expressed some disquiet at the very notion that rules of
procedural default could lead to the execution of a person whose trial
or sentencing was tainted by constitutional error. 53 That disquiet was
muted, however, because Justice Blackmun appeared to accept the
notion that procedural bar rules should generally be enforced, so long
as they are evenhandedly applied, unless there is some particularly
good reason to believe that the alleged error affected the outcome.
The Justice's greater concern in Adams was his belief that the
majority, having granted certiorari in order to reverse the court of ap-
peals on the issue of "cause," had simply refused to grapple with Ad-
ams' alternative arguments. 54 By rejecting those arguments in
cursory fashion, Justice Blackmun asserted, "the Court both leaves the
law in a shambles and reinstates respondent's death sentence without
lar, 494 U.S. 407, 412-15 (1990). Had Adams been decided only a year later, Adams' con-
tention that his claim had been "novel" at the time of his trial and direct appeal would
itself have been a sufficient basis for dismissing his habeas petition.
148. Adams, 489 U.S. at 410-12 n.6.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 421 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
151. See id. at 406, 416-421.
152. Id. at 421-24 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
153. See id. at 413 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[T]his Court is sending a man to a pre-
sumptively unlawful execution because he or his lawyers did not raise his objection at what
is felt to be the appropriate time for doing so.").
154. See id. at 421 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority treats the adequacy issue
as an afterthought, although it is an analytically antecedent issue.").
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ever bothering to determine what legal principle actually governs his
case."'155 Justice Blackmun concluded that:
the conclusory treatment [the alternative theories] receive does
not suffice to discharge the Court's responsibilities to respon-
dent, for whom these issues are a matter of life or death. In-
deed, I would have expected that when this Court reinstates a
death sentence vacated by the judgment below (and does so
purely for procedural reasons), it would be particularly careful
to consider fully all issues necessary to its disposition of the case.
To judge by footnote 6 of the Court's opinion, this expectation
was naive.
Justice Blackmun did not suggest that the majority had announced
incorrect legal principles that could be expected to affect a broad
range of future cases. Rather his anger was prompted by his belief
that the Court had made an inadequate effort to do justice to an indi-
vidual defendant.
5 7
Similarly in Coleman v. Thompson,'5 8 Justice Blackmun reacted
with extraordinary anger to what he perceived to be a case-specific
injustice. The defendant, in Coleman, was convicted and sentenced to
death in a Virginia court. His conviction and sentence were affirmed
on direct appeal. His petition for habeas corpus, which included sev-
eral federal constitutional claims that had not been raised on direct
review, was denied by a state trial court. Coleman sought to appeal
that ruling to the state supreme court, but his notice of appeal was
filed three days late, and the appeal was ultimately dismissed.'
59
Coleman then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in fed-
eral court. His petition included seven claims that had been raised for
the first time in his state habeas petition. The district court and court
of appeals held that the claims were procedurally barred by Cole-
man's failure to fie a timely appeal in the state habeas proceedings.
60
The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court held that "the important in-
terest in finality served by state procedural rules, and the significant
harm to the States that results from the failure of federal courts to
respect them" should generally preclude a convicted inmate from ob-
taining federal habeas corpus review of claims that had been defaulted
155. Id. at 425 n.15 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 425 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
157. Justice Blackmun's reference to "the Court's responsibilities to respondent," is
particularly striking, reflecting the view that even a convicted child murderer has an enti-
tlement to individualized consideration of his claims, at least in cases where the Supreme
Court chooses to grant review. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
158. 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
159. See id. at 726-28.
160. See id. at 728-29.
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in the state courts.1 6 ' The Court also held that "[b]ecause Coleman
had no right to counsel to pursue his appeal in state habeas, any attor-
ney error that led to the default of Coleman's claims in state court
cannot constitute cause to excuse the default in federal habeas."'162
Justice Blackmun filed one of his angriest dissents.163 He began
by stating that "[o]ne searches the majority's opinion in vain... for
any mention of petitioner Coleman's right to a criminal proceeding
free from constitutional defect or his interest in finding a forum for his
constitutional challenge to his conviction and sentence of death."'"
He accused the majority of "continu[ing] its crusade to erect petty
procedural barriers in the path of any state prisoner seeking review of
his federal constitutional claims," and he asserted that "the Court is
creating a Byzantine morass of arbitrary, unnecessary, and unjustifi-
able impediments to the vindication of federal rights."' 65 Justice
Blackmun stated that "[i]n its attempt to justify a blind abdication of
responsibility by the federal courts, the majority's opinion marks the
nadir of the Court's recent habeas jurisprudence, where the discourse
of rights is routinely replaced with the functional dialect of inter-
ests."'16 6 And he concluded that the Court's disposition of the case
represented "the quintessence of inequity."' 6 7
This is strong language, even by the standard of Supreme Court
dissents. At one level the case might seem to be an improbable source
of discord. The facts were so unusual that the precedential effect of
the Court's decision was likely to be small. But from another perspec-
tive, the Justice's reaction was unsurprising. Justice Blackmun was al-
ways uncomfortable with the notion that the long-term stability of the
law required an acceptance of unjust results in individual cases. To
deprive a capital defendant of access to a federal forum based on his
attorney's blunder ran counter to the Justice's most deeply held be-
liefs. If the attorney's failure to conform to state procedural rules had
reflected a deliberate effort to gain a tactical advantage, Justice Black-
mun might have accepted the majority's decision. Where the error
resulted from simple inadvertence, however, Justice Blackmun re-
161. Id. at 750.
162. Id. at 757.
163. See i&L at 758 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
164. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 758-59 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 764 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 774 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Fall 19981
302 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 26:271
garded the majority's decision as sacrificing the desire for fairness in
individual cases to no substantial end.1
68
Finally, Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Sawyer v.
Whitley169 sharply criticized the Court's restrictions on habeas corpus
review and suggested the course that he would ultimately take in Cal-
lins. The case involved a brutal torture-murder committed by Sawyer
and an accomplice.'7 0 Sawyer's conviction and sentence were af-
firmed on direct appeal, and both the state and federal courts denied
habeas relief.'7 ' Sawyer subsequently filed a second federal habeas
petition, which was denied by the district court and court of appeals,
chiefly on the grounds that the claims had either already been raised
and rejected, or had not been raised in a timely fashion. 7 2
The Court in Sawyer sought to define the circumstances in which
a federal habeas court could reach the merits of a successive, abusive,
or procedurally defaulted challenge to the manner in which a capital
sentence had been imposed. 7 3 Prior decisions of the Court had held
that successive, abusive, or procedurally defaulted claims could be
considered on federal habeas if the petitioner could demonstrate his
"actual innocence" of the crime for which he had been convicted.' 7 4
The question in Sawyer was how that standard should be applied to a
defendant who challenged the imposition of a sentence of death but
did not deny having committed the crime for which that sentence had
been imposed.' 75 The Court held that a defendant should be regarded
as "actually innocent" of the death penalty only if it could be said that,
in the absence of any constitutional error, no reasonable juror would
have concluded that the petitioner was eligible for the death penalty
under applicable state law.'
7 6
Justice Blackmun's opinion concurring in the judgment did not
attempt to define a precise alternative standard for determining when
168. See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
169. 505 U.S. 333 (1992).
170. See id. at 336.
171. See id. at 337.
172. See id. at 338.
173. See id. at 335. As the Court explained, a "successive" claim is one that was "heard
and decided on the merits in a previous petition"; an "abusive" claim is one that the de-
fendant failed without justification to raise in a prior petition; and a "procedurally de-
faulted" claim is one that the defendant failed to preserve during the state proceedings.
See id. at 338.
174. See id. at 339 (citing Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 448 (1986); Murray v. Car-
rier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537 (1986)).
175. Id. at 338.
176. See id. at 350.
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a federal habeas court could entertain abusive, successive, or de-
faulted challenges to capital sentencing proceedings. 17 7 His opinion
was instead a cri de coeur, an emotional attack both on the majority
opinion in Sawyer itself and on prior decisions restricting the scope of
federal habeas review. Justice Blackmun identified Warren McCles-
key and Roger Keith Coleman as "two victims of the 'new
habeas,""7 " and he asserted that the Court's disposition of McCles-
key's claims "starkly reveals the Court's skewed value system, in
which finality of judgments, conservation of state resources, and expe-
diency of executions seem to receive greater solicitude than justice
and human life."'17 9
Most significantly, Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Saw-
yer foreshadowed his ultimate conclusion in Callins that the death
penalty as currently administered is unconstitutional. Justice Black-
mun expressed his "ever-growing skepticism that, with each new deci-
sion from this Court constricting the ability of the federal courts to
remedy constitutional errors, the death penalty really can be imposed
fairly and in accordance with the requirements of the Eighth Amend-
ment."'' s0 He stated that his willingness to enforce the death penalty
despite his "own deep moral reservations" had been premised "on an
understanding that certain procedural safeguards, chief among them
the Federal Judiciary's power to reach and correct claims of constitu-
tional error on federal habeas review, would ensure that death
sentences are fairly imposed."'' And he concluded that "[t]he more
177. Justice Blackmun asserted that "[b]y the traditional understanding of habeas
corpus, a "fundamental miscarriage of justice" occurs whenever a conviction or sentence is
secured in violation of a federal constitutional right." Id. at 352 (Blackmun, J., concurring
in the judgment). Read broadly, that language would suggest that even abusive, succes-
sive, or defaulted constitutional claims should always be entertained, regardless of whether
the constitutional violation undermines the reviewing court's confidence in the correctness
of the conviction or sentence. See id. at 356 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment)
("The accusatorial system of justice adopted by the Founders affords a defendant certain
process-based protections that do not have accuracy of truth finding as their primary
goal."). Justice Blackmun stated, however, that he had endeavored to apply the "actual
innocence" standard in accordance with the Court's precedents. See id. at 357 n.2 (Black-
mun, J., concurring in the judgment). He also joined Justice Stevens' opinion concurring in
the judgment, which stated that a defendant should be regarded as "actually innocent" of
the death sentence only if he can "demonstrate that it is more likely than not that his death
sentence was clearly erroneous." Id. at 373 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Jus-
tice Stevens (joined by Justice Blackmun) concluded that Sawyer did not satisfy that stan-
dard. See id. at 373-75 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
178. 1& at 358 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
179. Id. at 359 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
180. Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
181. Id. at 358 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
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the Court constrains the federal courts' power to reach the constitu-
tional claims of those sentenced to death, the more the Court under-
mines the very legitimacy of capital punishment itself.'
'18 2
Conclusion
In order to properly understand Justice Blackmun's dissenting
opinion in Callins, and the personal struggle of which that dissent was
the culmination, two possible misconceptions should be avoided.
First, the Justice's Callins dissent cannot plausibly be regarded as the
product of a shift from conservatism to liberalism that is sometimes
thought to characterize Justice Blackmun's tenure on the Court. The
Justice's dissent in Furman, written a scant two years after his eleva-
tion to the Supreme Court, expressed "distaste, antipathy, and indeed,
abhorrence, for the death penalty." '183 The shift in Justice Blackmun's
views regarding the constitutionality of the death penalty therefore
cannot be attributed to a change of heart concerning the wisdom or
morality of capital punishment. Second, it is important to avoid the
misconception that Justice Blackmun ultimately adopted the "Bren-
nan/Marshall position" regarding the constitutionality of the death
penalty. Justice Blackmun always had great respect for Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall, both as Justices and as men. His approach to the
art of judging, however, was very different. Justice Blackmun was less
apt to ground his decisions in broad, categorical pronouncements
about the law, and more inclined to rely on case-specific analysis of
the facts of a particular dispute. Characteristically, his ultimate con-
clusion regarding the constitutionality of capital punishment was
based not on the view that the death penalty is cruel or unusual in the
abstract, but on the conclusion-grounded in decades of experience
on the federal bench-that it is unfairly or capriciously imposed in an
intolerably large number of individual cases.
Both in his Callins dissent and in his earlier concurring opinion in
Sawyer, Justice Blackmun stated that his willingness to enforce the
death penalty had always been premised on his understanding that
federal habeas review would be available to detect and remedy consti-
tutional violations, and thus to ensure that capital punishment would
be administered in a fair and consistent manner. When I first read
those opinions, I was somewhat skeptical. After all, I thought, if Jus-
tice Blackmun's views had prevailed in Furman and Woodson, there
182. Id. at 360 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
183. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 405 (1976).
would have been no meaningful constitutional constraints on the
death penalty. Absent an extensive body of federal constitutional law
regarding the States' administration of capital punishment, it seemed
to me, the availability of federal habeas review would have been of
scant utility.
More thorough analysis of the Justice's death penalty opinions
persuades me that my initial assessment was erroneous. My mistake
lay in the implicit assumption that the only important federal constitu-
tional claims in state death penalty cases are broad, systemic chal-
lenges to state capital sentencing statutes. That assumption is at odds
with Justice Blackmun's consistent emphasis on the need for fairness
to individual litigants. It was wholly in keeping with his overall ap-
proach to the art of judging that Justice Blackmun showed substantial
deference to state legislative judgments regarding the proper adminis-
tration of the death penalty, while attaching great importance to the
continued availability of effective federal review of case-specific
claims of constitutional error.
Despite his personal opposition, Justice Blackmun was willing to
acknowledge the constitutional legitimacy of capital punishment, so
long as he believed that all actors in the process would strive conscien-
tiously to ensure that individual capital trials were conducted and re-
viewed in a fair and impartial manner. During the course of his
tenure on the Court, however, he appears to have concluded both that
the incidence of error and caprice in state capital prosecutions was
unacceptably high, and that limitations on federal habeas review cre-
ated a substantial risk that constitutional errors would go uncorrected.
His concerns regarding the case-by-case administration of the death
penalty, rather than his moral opposition to capital punishment as
such, ultimately led to his dissent in Callins.
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